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Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated the need for an
urgent and comprehensive revision of financial market products, instruments and players.1 The root of the crisis stemmed from mortgage lending
in the United States: a lot of loans were given out to borrowers with questionable credit histories.2 A number of these risky loans were pooled
together to become securities and were sold as such to investors worldwide.3 The securitization of these mortgages was meant to spread the risk
† J.D. Candidate, Cornell University, 2018; B.A. in Psychology, New York University, 2014. I would like to thank the Cornell International Law Journal Editorial Board
for their invaluable help and feedback. I am dedicating this Note to the loving memory
of my father Eldar Nurizada.
1. See Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Director, Financial and Enterprise Affairs, and Special Adviser to the Secretary General for Financial Markets, OECD, Keynote Address at
ESMA Financial Innovation Day 2015 (Dec. 16, 2015).
2. See The Origins of Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-arestill-being-felt-five-years-article [https://perma.cc/H68D-RH8P].
3. Id.
50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 643 (2017)
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among many investors and prevent a future crisis.4 However, the measure
only ignited instability because many global investors acquired these American securities to make high profits.5 Therefore, when the housing market
in the United States sharply declined, the mortgage-based securities also
experienced a sudden and steep decrease in value.6 The global investors
tried to get rid of their securities, which then led to market panic because
everyone started to resell their securities, decreasing the value of the underlying loans even further.7
Thus, securities were identified as one of the financial market instruments requiring broader regulation worldwide.8 Although some central
banks in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States took immediate
action to resolve the securities problem (such as increasing the purchase of
long-term government securities), these measures were only short-term
solutions.9 Additionally, the global nature of the crisis required global
cooperation, with a body or organization setting the same (or equivalent)
standards for the global markets.10 In the absence of international cooperation, countries will engage in a race-to-the-bottom: they will try to limit
regulation as much as possible to attract investors, issuers, and other market participants.11 Deregulation does not work in securities area, and the
global financial crisis vividly showed its inefficiency.12
The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
(also known as the G-20) was created to organize international economic
cooperation in financial sphere.13 Comprised of the national leaders or
ministers of the member states, the G-20 is not a formal international
organization.14 In other words, the G-20 resembles a network because it
does not have formal requirements of membership, and the states have not
delegated decision-making authority to the group.15 The members of the
4. See Brian Perry, Credit Crisis: What Caused the Crisis?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/university/credit-crisis/credit-crisis4.asp [https://perma.cc/
2MBL-UZ6B].
5. See Manav Tanneeru, How a “Perfect Storm” Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/economic.crisis.explainer/index.html?iref=news
search [https://perma.cc/7YHX-QUSL].
6. Perry, supra note 4.
7. Tanneeru, supra note 5.
8. See World Economic Outlook April 2009: Crisis and Recovery, INT’L MONETARY
FUND 5– 6 (2009).
9. Id. at 6.
10. See Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137,
1147 (2016).
11. See Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581,
1597 (2010).
12. Id.
13. See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 357
(2010).
14. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1462 (2013).
15. Leonardo Martinez-Diaz & Ngaire Woods, The G20 and the Developing World,
GLOBAL BRIEF (Feb. 19, 2010), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/02/19/the-g20-and-thedeveloping-world/ [https://perma.cc/2S3D-KT6V].
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G-20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the European Union.16 The decisions that the G-20 produces are based on
consensus and are not legally binding.17 Despite the absence of a formal
legal force, the organization can still have a profound effect on international financial regulation.18 Firstly, the G-20 members control the majority of the votes in the International Financial Institutions.19 Secondly,
these member states make up eighty-five percent of the world’s GDP; therefore, they can exert great financial pressure to force compliance with their
rules.20
Although securities regulators do not participate in the G-20 meetings,
the organization still expresses a number of opinions and communiqués
regarding macroprudential regulation of securities firms and products.21
In the light of the global financial crisis, the G-20 has announced a series
of agreed-upon reforms that involved important issues of securities regulation.22 These reforms include required registration of hedge funds, regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, regulation of derivatives, and enhancement
of the accounting recognition of loan loss provision.23
While it is true that the G-20 does not have the power to enforce its
policies and communiqués under the international law,24 the organization
still defines the objectives for the global financial regulation.25 For example, the G-20 can establish monitoring bodies, enforcement measures and
technical assistance providers (also known as “enablers”) to aid the countries in their compliance with the newly promulgated rules and
standards.26
This Note will argue that the G-20 has achieved certain evident successes in the area of securities regulation; although there is a lack of regulatory action in shadow banking and a number of structural factors affecting
the organization’s efficiency in achieving all of its goals, the organization’s
efforts make a difference. Part A of this note will discuss the G-20 and the
Local Currency Bond Market Initiative and evaluate its success on the
example of ESMID program. Part B will discuss the creation of the Financial Stability Board (reorganizing of the Financial Stability Forum as the
Financial Stability Board (FSB)) and the board’s achievements. Part C will
discuss the relationship between the International Organization of Securi16. G20 Members, G20, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/
perma.cc/CTW5-RPQC].
17. See Verdier, supra note 14, at 1462.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Brummer, supra note 13, at 358.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 358– 59.
24. Id. at 359.
25. Grinberg, supra note 4, at 1147.
26. Id.

[https://
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ties Commissions (IOSCO) and the G-20 and IOSCO’s efforts to encourage
compliance with securities regulations. Parts A through C will evaluate the
effectiveness of each initiative as well as its shortcomings and reasons
behind these weaknesses.
Part D will discuss the role of the G-20 in the cross-border securities
investments area. Parts A through D will analyze the factors affecting the
G-20’s ability to achieve uniform and voluntary compliance with the
promulgated policies and standards regarding securities regulation. One
of such factors lies in the ultimate nature of the G-20: the organization can
set standards and encourage the members to comply with them, but it cannot internationally enforce its own laws. Additionally, it is important to
keep in mind that securities regulators do not participate in the G-20 meetings because they assume that the systemic risk presented by securities
cannot be properly assessed.27 Part E will discuss credit default swaps,
their role in the global financial crisis and the actions taken at the G-20’s
request. Part F will discuss the crowdfunding, which prominently emerged
after the crisis, and its connection to securities regulation. Finally, Part G
will conclude with the suggestions for the improvement of the G-20’s efficiency in the area of securities regulation and evaluation of the organization’s strengths. This Note will conclude by explaining the complexities of
securities and securities regulation that complicated the work of the G-20.
I.

Background

The need for more uniform international standards in the area of
securities regulation was evident even before the global financial crisis of
2008.28 Moreover, this was not the first time that the G-20 was trying to
harmonize securities regulation.29 The Finance Ministers addressed the
topic of securities regulation at the G-7 Finance Ministers Meeting in February 2007 (the G-7 is similar to the G-20 in its mission and structure and
includes the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States).30 Ironically, the goal of that meeting was
to encourage free trade in securities to liberalize cross-border capital markets.31 The G-7 leaders failed to realize the riskiness of certain securities,
such as the US “subprime” household debt, which was greatly securitized
27. Brummer, supra note 13, at 358.
28. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2 (2008).
29. Clyde Stoltenberg, Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey, & Michael
Cuthbert, The Past Decade of Regulatory Change in the U.S. and EU Capital Market
Regimes: An Evolution from National Interests toward International Harmonization with
Emerging G-20 Leadership, 29 BERKELEY J. INT.’L L. 577, 617 (2011).
30. See G7/8 Finance Ministers Meetings, G7 INFO. CTR. (Feb. 10, 2007), http://
www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm070210.htm [https://perma.cc/6EKU-9BYU]; see also
G7 and G20, GLOBAL NETWORK, http://www.globalnetwork.org/g7-and-g20 [https://
perma.cc/R6EG-UHGT].
31. G7 INFO. CTR., supra note 30.
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and partly exported to the European Union and other countries.32 As a
result of the domino effect, there was hardly a country left that was not
affected by the crisis.33
This failure and the subsequent crisis as well as a number of other
reasons demonstrated that a more inclusive international body needs to
supervise harmonization of securities regulation.34 The G-20 has several
advantages over the G-7. Firstly, it includes rapidly developing countries
such as China.35 Secondly, although the global financial crisis came from
the most developed countries, its consequences were felt by less developed
and poorer countries as well.36 Therefore, the G-20 is better positioned to
create a set of regulations that will accommodate not only a select number
of the most developed countries in the world, but also more vulnerable
countries.37
II. Analysis
A.

The G-20 and the Local Currency Bond Market Initiative

Local Currency Bond Market initiative was the G-20’s way to
encourage financial deepening after the global financial crisis.38 Financial
deepening is the expansion of the range of instruments, actors, liquidity,
and risk sharing capacity to enhance the stability of the international monetary system.39 Although this initiative was not directed specifically at
securities regulation, securities were a part of the financial deepening.40
For example, the G-20 proposed that the World Bank Group (WBG) would
provide technical assistance to the countries with the highest vulnerability
due to the size of capital flows relative to the ability of their financial markets to absorb these inflows.41
As part of this technical assistance, the WBG created Efficient Securities Markets Institutional Development program (ESMID) in Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Nigeria to develop non-government bond
markets.42 Although these sub-Saharan countries were not responsible for
the global financial crisis, they had an estimated loss of fifty billion dol32. E. Philip Davis, The Evolution of Financial Structure in the G-7 over 1997– 2010,
221 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 11, 14 (2012).
33. Marc F. Plattner, From the G-8 to the G-20, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 31, 33 (2011).
34. See James Wolfensohn, G-20 Should Supplant the G-7, 26 NEW PERSP. Q. 13, 13
(2009).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. G20 Action Plan to Support the Development of Local Currency Bond Markets,
paras. 1– 2, (Nov. 3– 4, 2011), https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/
Tasks/Financial_and_monetary_system/Conferences/2011_11_17_frankfurt_action_
plan.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [https://perma.cc/8M8K-H6M8].
39. Id. at para. 7.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Developing Domestic Securities Markets, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/SecuritiesMarkets_Brochure_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MS65-P923].

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-3\CIN307.txt

648

unknown

Seq: 6

7-MAR-18

Cornell International Law Journal

12:34

Vol. 50

lars.43 The founders of the program realized that securities contribute to
financial and private sector development.44 Despite their importance for
economic development, securities markets are underdeveloped in many
emerging countries.45 Thus, the program facilitated the establishment of a
regional Securities Industry Training Institute to train local specialists and
enable financial self-sufficiency of the countries.46 This program also
involved the regulators to provide a framework for licensing of market participants in the region.47
At the end of ESMID program, the WBG Management conducted the
assessment of the outcomes of the program.48 The program produced a
number of successful achievements.49 For example, ESMID helped the participating countries acquire $950 million in new bond issues by streamlining approval and regulatory processes.50 As a result of the enhancement of
financial regulation, the time taken to approve bond issues in Kenya and
Tanzania was reduced to forty-five and sixty days, respectively.51
The ESMID program was especially critical in the emergence of Nigeria’s bond market providing affordable medium-to-long term capital to governments and businesses.52 The program sponsored a number of reforms
in the bond-market area (such as streamlining bond issuance procedures,
reducing transaction costs, etc.) that produced a number of positive outcomes.53 The domestic bond market capitalization increased to $36.42 billion, consisting of federal, state and corporate bonds.54 As a result of
increased capitalization, the bond market is more efficient in supplying the
long term capital needed to close Nigeria’s infrastructure gap which has
been estimated at $350 billion over the next ten years.55
It is fair to say that the WBG’s program was a success, considering the
results and outcomes in the participant countries. The bond markets of
43. Dirk Wellem te Velde, Economic Policies in G-20 and African Countries during the
Global Financial Crisis: Who’s the Apprentice, Who’s the Master?, 23 AFR. DEV. REV. 380,
382 (2011).
44. Id.
45. End-Of-Program Evaluation Of The Efficient Securities Markets Institutional Development Program In Africa (ESMID Africa), DEVEX (Mar. 28, 2013), https://
www.devex.com/funding/tenders/1887/1887 [https://perma.cc/Z8B4-FLJT].
46. World Bank Group, supra note 42.
47. Id.
48. Devex, supra note 45.
49. ESMID Home, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/RegProjects_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/ESMID_Home/ [https://perma.cc/
R8PA-RX9P].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Arunma Oteh, Building a Vibrant Domestic Bond in Nigeria, AFR. FIN. MKT. INITIATIVE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.africanbondmarkets.org/en/news-events/african-bondmarket-review/article/building-a-vibrant-domestic-bond-market-in-nigeria-61665/
[https://perma.cc/GZT2-RG68].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Nigeria and Kenya continue their healthy development.56 The fact that
ESMID is planning expansion into the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean region highlights the success of the program.57
B.

The Financial Stability Forum/Financial Stability Board, the G-20
and Securities

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) was founded in 2009 (through the
expansion of the already existing the Financial Stability Forum) to supervise the global financial system.58 Notably, the FSB’s membership is not
limited to G-20 membership; the board also includes Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland.59 The G-20 asked the FSB to support countries in
their effort to strengthen financial regulation.60 First, the G-20 asked the
FSB, together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to review regulatory and supervisory actions concerning local currency bond markets
that affect financial stability and make necessary recommendations.61
Second, the FSB was appointed to support countries in strengthening
financial regulation and supervision to facilitate domestic capital markets.62 Third, the FSB assumed responsibility for raising the financial stability issues regarding the emerging and developing economies to the G20.63
The board’s 2009 charter lists the mandates and tasks of the FSB in
the context of international financial regulation.64 Although the list does
not specifically mention securities regulation, review of the charter’s
remainder reveals that securities regulation is one of its implicit goals.65
First, the list of the FSB members included securities commissions of a
number of countries and IOSCO.66 Second, after the Seoul Summit in
2010, the G-20 leaders requested the FSB to recommend a set of regulations for the shadow banking industry.67 Securities form an important
part of this industry because the shadow banking system uses securities
56. Katharine Jackson, Pension-Funding the Future: Encouraging the Sustainable and
Socially Responsible Development of Securities Market in Sub-Saharan Africa, 44 INT’L LAW.
791, 793 (2010).
57. INT’L FIN. CORP., supra note 49.
58. FSB Raises Concerns over Implementation of G-20 Reforms, FOW MAG. (Apr. 18,
2011), https://globalinvestorgroup.com/articles/2809313/fsb-raises-concerns-overimplementation-of-g-20-reforms [https://perma.cc/4TFY-UDUK].
59. Daniel E. Noelle, Who’s in Charge of Fixing the World’s Financial System? The
Un[?]der-Appreciated Lead Role of the G-20 and the FSB, 24 FIN. MKTS. INST. & INSTRUMENTS 1, 5 (2015).
60. G20 Action Plan to Support the Development of Local Currency Bond Markets,
supra note 38.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cecilia C. Lee, Reframing Complexity: Hedge Fund Policy Paradigm For the Way
Forward, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 478, 526 (2015).
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lending and repo transactions to fund hedge funds.68 Shadow banking
involves not only big commercial and investment banks, but firms of different sizes.69 Although securities regulation was never the sole and explicit
goal of the FSB, a careful review of its tasks in the context of international
financial regulation demonstrates the importance of securities regulation
to the board.
One of the FSB’s unique advantages is that the board could identify
the data gaps revealed by the global financial crisis and close those gaps.70
Although the FSB has been regularly tracking financial data in a number of
sectors, including securities, it expanded its work in response to the G-20’s
request.71 The FSB joined forces with the IMF and, after extensive consultations with the experts from different sectors, they produced twenty recommendations regarding four areas, one of which includes cross-border
financial linkages.72 This investigative work has a great potential in securities regulation due to the comprehensive information of both domestic and
foreign entities.73 For example, information on the exposure of domestic
banks to securities of nonbank financial institutions of foreign jurisdiction
is useful in the event a nonbank financial institution shows signs of
struggle.74
The FSB as an organization is useful in securities regulation because it
not only sets the standards, but coordinates other standard-setting bodies.75 The board is also responsible for supervising the actions required to
realize the improvements of the global financial system.76 The FSB
launched a peer review program in 2010 to test the effectiveness of the
regulations developed by standard-setting bodies.77 This measure encourages countries to conform to the promulgated standards.78 Although the
FSB’s membership is limited, it includes the largest and fastest growing
economies.79 Thus, peer review by these countries reduces the risk of nonmembers’ failure to regulate securities to affect the board’s members.
However, the FSB’s efficiency is not uniform. For example, the board
struggled to timely report the progress on over-the-counter (OTC) deriva68. Id. at 508.
69. Daniel K. Tarullo, International Cooperation in Central Banking, 47 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 1, 6 (2014).
70. Robert Heath, Why are the G-20 Data Gaps Initiatives and SDDS Plus Relevant for
Financial Stability Analysis?, 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/13/6,
2013).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id.
75. Emilios Avgouleas, Berle IV: The Future of Financial and Securities Markets The
Fourth Annual Symposium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society:
Rationales and Designs to Implement an Institutional Big Bang in the Governance of Global
Finance, 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 321, 348 (2013).
76. Noelle, supra note 59, at 5.
77. Peer Reviews, FIN. STABILITY BOARD (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.fsb.org/what-wedo/implementation-monitoring/peer_reviews/ [https://perma.cc/Z27C-QS57].
78. Id.
79. Brummer, supra note 13, at 361.
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tives market reform among the G-20 nations.80 Certain countries’ failure
to cooperate due to their inability to move from the market analysis stage of
the reform caused this delay.81 Additionally, individual countries had
their own visions of the required reforms in the OTC derivatives market,
which often conflicted with the uniform regulatory framework.82 For
example, India refused to enforce electronic platform trading of OTC derivatives because India believed that it could retain the flexibility of OTC
transaction by requiring reporting through a central trade reporting platform and central clearing.83 This refusal undermines the goals of the G-20
because the countries like India do not conform to a uniform set of standards and expectations.84
There are a number of ways the FSB can improve its performance and,
as a result, increase its efficiency in the OTC derivatives market. First, the
FSB needs to engage its members and encourage their participation to
ensure open, inclusive discussions that will lead to homogenous and balanced regulation standards.85 Otherwise, the discrepancy in the countries’
compliance with the promulgated rules will create regulatory arbitrage.86
This arbitrage will reduce the credibility of the FSB as organization and will
further alienate the members.87
C.

The G-20 and IOSCO

The G-20 was one of the first organizations that reacted to the global
financial crisis by addressing the possible solutions to securities regulation
at the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit.88 The goal of the summit was to update
international securities regulation.89 The leaders of the member states
asked their Finance Ministers to propose recommendations regarding
“reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly for complex securities in times of stress.”90 In addition to these discussions, the G20 also proposed that issuers of risky securities (which were the root of the
problem in the global financial crisis) must hold a proportion of those
securities on their own account.91 This proposal was approved and implemented into domestic regulation; for example, the European Parliament set
80. FOW MAG. supra note 58.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Angelique Leondis, The Global Financial Crisis: The G-20’s Most Recent Action
Plan, 25 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 315, 322 (2010).
85. Olin Wethington, G-20’s Stability Board Needs Firmer Footing, AM. BANKER:
BANKTHINK (Aug 2, 2011 7:24 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/g-20sstability-board-needs-firmer-footing [https://perma.cc/9MLB-PVZL].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Stoltenberg et al., supra note 29, at 643.
89. Id.
90. Joseph J. Norton, NIFA-II or ‘Bretton Woods-II’?: The G-20 (Leaders) Summit Process on Managing Global Financial Markets and the World Economy- Quo Vadis?, 11 J.
BANKING REG. 261, 283 (2010).
91. Andre Gabus & Alexander Hawthorne, The G-20’s First Timid Steps to Prevent
Crises?, 34– 35 FIN. & BIEN COMMUN 1, 2 (2009).
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five percent retention on the accounts of issuers.92
One of the ways the G-20 can regulate securities is by exerting pressure directly on IOSCO, an international organization devoted specifically
to securities regulation.93 IOSCO is the only world organization that contains almost all securities commissions.94 In that regard, the connection
between the G-20 and FSB should not be underestimated because the FSB
oversees the work of a number of standard-setting bodies, including
IOSCO itself.95 The FSB also acknowledged the role of IOSCO as international standard-setting body in the board’s charter in 2009.96
As a reaction to the global financial crisis, IOSCO set three main goals
in its 2010 principles report: (1) to protect investors; (2) to ensure fairness,
transparency and efficiency of the markets; and (3) to reduce systemic
risks.97 The organization stated these goals rather generally; that is why it
produced a number of papers and reports with more specific objectives.98
For example, IOSCO’s paper Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities
Regulators, prepared by the organization’s Technical Committee, explained
the sources of the systemic risks and encouraged the regulators to be mindful of the gaps created by lightly regulated products.99 The paper pointed
out the tools available to the regulators (such as prudential and governance
requirements) and reminded them that IOSCO can help with disclosure in
international securities markets.100
In addition, IOSCO realized that the global financial crisis mainly
stemmed from financial innovations such as collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and so on.101 Therefore, IOSCO urged regulators to devise regulation with particular attention to the risks attached to
financial innovations.102 The organization recommended that the securities regulators review regulation of financing activities to ensure that evolving products do not escape regulatory coverage.103
IOSCO also provided noticeable guidance in the regulation of hedge
funds.104 Hedge funds are pools of assets, which are usually securities,
professionally managed through the use of investing techniques.105 However, hedge funds are not registered— and therefore, not regulated— as usual
92. Id
93. See Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 849, 900 (2012).
94. Id.
95. See Arie C. Eernisse, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in Improving
the International Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 239, 242 (2012).
96. Financial Stability Board Charter, FSB, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
r_090925d.pdf?page_moved=1 [https://perma.cc/3GTL-MR4B].
97. Karmel, supra note 93, at 851.
98. Id. at 852.
99. Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators, OICU-IOSCO, Technical
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission (Feb. 2011).
100. Id.
101. Id at 18– 19.
102. Id at 20, 51.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 54.
105. Karmel, supra note 93, at 851.
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investment companies in a number of countries, such as the United
States.106 The harms that hedge funds contributed to the global financial
crisis were so significant that the funds became a point of discussion of
several G-20 meetings.107 Finally, the G-20 decided that the hedge funds
should be registered by the national regulators and the funds’ managers
must report systemically important data to these regulators.108
As a response to this decision, IOSCO issued a report on hedge fund
regulation, which incorporated the organization’s own research and comments from the public and the industry members.109 This report included
six recommendations aimed at investor protection and avoidance of systemic risks posed by hedge funds, such as disclosure of managers’ conflicts
of interests and ways managers deal with those conflicts.110 The United
States and the European Union followed this report and responded with
legislation. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act requires hedge funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).111 The European
Union also produced two pieces of legislation: one for Alternative Investment Fund (AIF)— which includes hedge funds— and Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM).112 Major cross-border financial institutions
with presence in both the United States and the European Union will have
to conform to the Dodd-Frank and AIF/AIFM.113
IOSCO offers a number of advantages in securities regulation.114
First, as a standard-setting body, it can encourage the members to enter
into agreements to address issues such as sharing of data and coordinating
action on risks.115 Second, the organization can highlight the areas in
securities regulation that need urgent reform through its Technical
Committee.116
The problem with analyzing the efficiency of the G-20 securities regulation through IOSCO is that IOSCO includes members besides the G-20
countries.117 These members are often emerging markets; thus, IOSCO
needs to formulate general principles that can accommodate these markets
as well as the developed ones.118 Considering the challenge IOSCO faces,
it is difficult to determine whether the G-20 exerts enough pressure on the
IOSCO to promulgate certain securities policies or IOSCO simply cannot
106. Id.
107. Id. at 858.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 861.
112. Id. at 864.
113. Peter Green & Jeremy Jennings-Mares, Comparison of Dodd Frank Act and EU
Regulatory Reform, MORRISON FOERSTER (2011), http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/
Images/Reg-Reform-PPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/W65E-YXQT].
114. Karmel, supra note 93, at 855.
115. Id.
116. Jane Diplock, The Global Financial Architecture: Twenty-First Century Solutions, 19
AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 155, 157 (2009).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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implement these policies without hurting the emerging markets. On the
other hand, the G-20 itself includes emerging markets (such as Mexico),119
which means that some of the emerging market countries participated in
the production of the regulations.120 Therefore, it is much more likely that
these participants will conform to the regulations in comparison to the
markets that are forced to comply with these regulations.
Although the cooperation between the G-20 and IOSCO is not always
perfect, a number of instances that demonstrate uniformity of goals in
securities regulation.121 For example, IOSCO has a program to help the
members evaluate their own securities regulation against the principles
promulgated by IOSCO.122 The G-20 endorsed these principles by recommending its members submit to the Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP) and undergo periodic peer review using IOSCO Principles.123
Another example of cooperation between the G-20 and IOSCO is that
IOSCO Principles reflect the goals of the G-20 leaders.124 These principles
pursue three main objectives: (1) protection of investors; (2) promotion of
market’s fairness, efficiency and transparency; (3) reduction of systemic
risk.125 These objectives resemble the G-20’s goals discussed during the
Seoul Summit in 2010.126 Although the G-20’s goals targeted financial regulation in general, securities regulation is a concrete example of financial
regulation. The G-20 paid a particular attention to the issue of systemic
risk; in fact, this issue was addressed almost immediately after crisis at the
Washington Summit in 2008.127
Despite IOSCO’s shortcomings and challenging diversity of its member body, the organization has capacity to become more efficient in securities regulation.128 For instance, IOSCO’s cooperation with various bodies
such as the World Bank can be used to help IOSCO become a supervisory
convergence organization rather than a simple harmonizer of standards.129
Additionally, the diversity of the markets within the G-20 presents a
challenge for devising a common set of regulations because different markets have their own understanding of the necessary regulation.130 For
example, the United States and the United Kingdom prefer greater market
119. The Group of Twenty: A History, OFFICIAL G-20 PUBLICATIONS (G-20 Info. Ctr.,
Toronto, Can.), Nov. 2008, at 8.
120. Verdier, supra note 14, at 1420.
121. Diplock, supra note 116, at 157.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Badar Alam Iqbal, G-20: Global Issues and Challenges, 4 TRANSNAT’L CORP. REV.
72, 76 (2012).
127. Hank Boerner, Global Capital Markets and Corporate Compliance Reforms Ahead:
The G-20 Tackle the Issues, 13 CORP. FIN. REV. 33, 34 (2009).
128. Daniel Broby, The Case for a Roadmap towards Financial Regulatory Convergence,
21 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 397, 401 (2013).
129. Id.
130. See Eswar Prasad, The G-20 and The World Economy: Sink or Swim, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION REP., 3 (2009).
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freedom, whereas countries of the continental Europe, such as France,
think it is important to have tighter regulation system, especially in the
aftermath of the crisis.131 Considering these differences, the difficulties in
achieving common objectives are no longer surprising.
Another commonly shared critique of the G-20 is that despite the G20’s diversity of the members, the organization still faces the same
problems as the G-7: too many leaders present in the same room and weak
political mandate.132 The increased number of leaders means that the time
that could have been spent discussing solutions is dedicated to the
rehearsed speeches of the leaders.133 Additionally, the structure of the
organization (consisting mainly of finance ministers) ignores the political
reality that some countries’ regulation systems are more complex.134 For
example, the U.S. regulatory authority does not consist only of ministers,
but also of several agencies that often have to share their authority; such
system complicates compliance with the promulgated rules of the G-20.135
Ultimately, the G-20 communiqués are not enforceable and that is
why the G-20 relies on the reputation of its members to conform to the
promulgated standards and policies.136 For example, if a G-20 country
does not conform to the communiqués, it will have a difficulty promoting
its own policies in the future.137
D.

The G-20 and Cross-Border Securities Investments

The amount of cross-border securities investments had been steadily
increasing until the global financial crisis took place.138 For example, the
share of debt securities held by cross-border investors jumped by eight percent from 2001 to 2007, whereas the share decreased by three percent from
2009 to 2012.139 Although the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Survey (CPIS) has tracked cross-border securities investments, policy makers have largely ignored these data.140 The global financial crisis demonstrated the global significance of the cross-border securities investment and
the need for the G-20 to closely monitor the investments’ rates and issuance of securities globally.
The Handbook on Securities Statistics (Handbook), joint work of the
IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank for International Set131. Id.
132. Jonathan Burks, Improving International Policy Coordination in the Wake of the
Financial Crisis, 20 J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 144, 146– 47 (2009).
133. Nouriel Roubini, It is a G-Zero, Not a G-20, World, 28 NEW PERSP. Q. 27, 29
(2011).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Brummer, supra note 13, at 359.
137. Id.
138. Branimir Gruic & Andreas Schrimpf, Cross-Border Investments in Global Debt
Markets Since the Crisis, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.bis.org/
publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1403y.htm [https://perma.cc/SSZ3-5UC5].
139. Id.
140. Heath, supra note 70, at 5, 10.
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tlements (BIS), represents an attempt to track securities information.141
The G-20 endorsed the development of the Handbook through the FSB and
IMF’s 2009 report “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps.”142 The
global crisis demonstrated that more stringent supervision of securities is
crucial to restoration of financial health worldwide.143 The three parts of
the Handbook provides data on debt and equity securities.144 One of the
benefits of the Handbook is that its data is internationally comparable
because the central banks and financial experts of a number of countries
contributed information.145 The availability of internationally comparable
securities data allows countries to come up with more efficient fiscal policies.146 The Handbook contains comprehensive information on securities,
including institutions dealing with debt and equity securities, differences
between subtypes of debt and equity securities, and so on.147
The IMF’s work in the area of cross-border securities also deserves
recognition.148 In response to the criticism that information from the
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) was relatively obscure, the
IMF decided to conduct the CPIS twice instead of once a year.149 Semiannual reporting should decrease delay in the release of results.150 However, there are still a number of weaknesses in the conduction of the survey. For example, the CPIS should increase the number of countries
covered because at the moment only twenty-five countries that the IMF
considers to have systemically important financial sectors participate.151
However, the global financial crisis demonstrated the interconnectedness
of the global financial system. Although a particular country might not be
systemically important, the decline of such country’s financial health can
severely affect a systemically important country.
E.

Credit Default Swaps

Credit default swaps (CDS) are instruments supposed to cover holders
against default on an underlying security.152 In other words, CDS are conceptually insurance contracts against the cost of default of a company.153
They are considered as a type of OTC credit derivatives.154 Issuers of these
141. Handbook on Securities Statistics, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2015), http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/wgsd/pdf/hss.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ST5-WC4W].
142. Id.
143. Diplock, supra note 116, at 155.
144. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Heath, supra note 70, at 15.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Gabus & Hawthorne, supra note 90, at 3.
153. Rene M Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74
(2010).
154. Rama Cont & Andreea Minca, Credit Default Swaps and Systemic Risk, 247
ANNALS OPERATIONS RES. 523, 524 (2016).
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instruments have no obligation to retain reserves for potential liabilities
and, therefore, could issue unlimited quantities of swaps; it is not surprising that these instruments contributed to market destabilization in the
global financial crisis.155 The downfall of AIG is a concrete example of
swaps’ destructive role in the crisis.156
Thus, it is not surprising that CDS were on the agenda at the G-20
Washington Summit in 2008.157 The need for immediate regulatory
actions was so obvious that CDS were listed in “Immediate Actions by
March 31, 2009,” stipulated by all the G-20 leaders at the summit.158 The
fear of CDS’ systemic risk motivated some of the regulators to propose a
ban on the swaps; however, the majority of leaders (such as the United
States President George W. Bush) opposed complete banning and offered
more stringent oversight and regulation of the instrument.159 Additionally, CDS can be useful means of risk allocation.160 However, the opacity
of the CDS markets destroyed its utility and contributed to the crisis; therefore, the need for restorative regulation was obvious.161
Although everyone at the Washington Summit understood that urgent
action was required, there was little consensus on which particular course
of action to pursue.162 The G-20 realized that they would need help from a
standard-setting body and, as in a number of issues in securities regulation, they requested that help from IOSCO.163 After the Cannes Summit in
2011, the G-20 asked IOSCO to prepare a report assessing “the functioning
of credit default swap (CDS) markets and the role of those markets in price
formation of underlying assets.”164 This report was due by the next G-20
summit in Los Cabos.165 This report addresses issues raised at the Cannes
Summit, such as a need to harmonize policies across borders and increase
cooperation between regulators.166 In addition to these issues, IOSCO’s
report discusses recent changes and trends in CDS markets as well as provides information about trading, pricing and clearing of CDS.167
155. Gabus & Hawthorne, supra note 91, at 3.
156. Cont & Minca, supra note 154, at 524.
157. G-20 Wants Quick Action on Credit Default Swaps, but Bush Talks Them into Toothless Regulation, WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Nov. 15, 2008), https://georgewashington2.blog
spot.com/2008/11/g-20-wants-quick-action-on-credit.html?m=0 [https://perma.cc/
W6MQ-GENG].
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. XAVIER FREIXAS, MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & RICHARD PORTES, MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: KEY ISSUES FOR THE G20 115 (2016).
161. Id. at 116.
162. Id.
163. IOSCO Publishes a Report for the G20 on the Credit Default Swap Market, OICUIOSCO (June 16, 2012), https://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS243.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MV2Q-4NDH].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of Name-and-Shame in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2012).
167. OICU-IOSCO, supra note 163.
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Crowdfunding and Securities Regulation

Although the global financial crisis played a big role in attracting the
attention to securities regulation, new financial issues have emerged since
the crisis that require not only attention, but also regulation and legislation.168 Crowdfunding is an example of such issues; although the phenomenon existed before the crisis, its growth has been expanding since the
2010s.169 Crowdfunding operates on web or mobile based platforms; its
operating nature can present significant cross-border issues.170 Lending
and investment-based crowdfunding is not regulated, although banks and
investment firms performing the same functions are heavily regulated.171
Some authors propose that lack of regulation in shadow banking allowed a
phenomenon such as crowdfunding escaping regulation for the most
part.172 Additionally, securities in investment crowdfunding projects are
not listed, which can create a number of problems such as the risk of dilution, capital loss, and so on.173
Although the G-20 never officially requested a standard-setting body
to intervene into the issue of crowdfunding regulation, the organization
definitely paid attention to this expanding area.174 The G-20 realized that
the aftermath of the global financial crisis forced banks to lend less and on
much stricter terms, and many SMEs suffered as a result.175 Crowdfunding as an alternative source of financing helps SMEs that lack collateral or
credit history to satisfy banks’ requirements for lending.176 Crowdfunding
is also crucial to entrepreneurs because it provides an alternative source of
funding; entrepreneurial companies can be found in every single member
of the G-20.177 Crowdfunding is especially important in the G-20 member
168. Klaus Peter Follak, Crowdfunding in International and National Regulatory
Frameworks, 32 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 167, 167 (2015).
169. Giuliana Borello, Veronica de Crescenzo & Flavio Pichler, The Funding Gap and
the Role of Financial Return Funding: Some Evidence from European Platforms, 20 J. BANKING & COM. 1, 2 (2015).
170. The Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Statement on Addressing Regulation of Crowdfunding, OICU-IOSCO (Dec. 2015), https://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD521.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YYENYBE].
171. Follak, supra note 168, at 167.
172. Roy Girasa, Shadow Banking: Nature, Regulation, and Developments, 35 BANKING
& FIN. SERV.’S POL’Y REP. 1, 4 (2016).
173. Advice: Investment-based Crowdfunding, ESMA (Dec. 18, 2014), https://
www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-1560_advice_on_invest
ment-based_crowdfunding.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KCP-NQJZ].
174. G20/OECD Support Note on Diversification of Financial Instruments for SMES,
OECD (July 2016), https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/financing-for-investment/G20OECD-Support-Note-on-Diversified-Financial-Instruments-for-SMEs.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QL7T-K5MX].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. G20 Funding the Future, EY, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
EY_G20_-_Funding_the_future:/$FILE/EY-g20-Funding-the-future.pdf.
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countries with lack of available finance such as China.178
However, the G-20 also realized the risks associated with crowdfunding, primarily the concern about financial safety of investors.179 Once the
G-20 openly addressed crowdfunding, the need to take at least some kind
of monitoring action was obvious.180 Thus, several standard-setting bodies
decided to approach regulation of crowdfunding out of their own initiative.
For example, the IOSCO, duly noting the advantages of crowdfunding,
urged to strengthen regulation in this area to protect investors.181 Its survey findings from twenty-three IOSCO members in the “Crowdfunding 2015
Survey Responses Report” (‘‘Survey Report”) highlight major risks for investors that invest in crowdfunding.182 One of the biggest problems is the
absence of secondary market for crowdfunding securities, which may limit
the investor’s ability to sell or liquidate these securities.183
However, IOSCO refrained from proposing international standards,
explained that most regulatory regimes have just been implemented, and
therefore preferred wait-and-see approach.184 This approach might be the
most optimal one at this stage because the G-20 member countries differ
greatly in their approach to the role crowdfunding plays in their respective
financial markets.185 For example, the U.S. strongly favors crowdfunding;
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act provides venues for
expanding the use of crowdfunding.186 On the other hand, countries such
as Italy and Germany prefer to restrict crowdfunding through stricter regulation.187 For example, Italian legislation requires its crowdfunding platforms to partner with banks and other financial institutions licensed to
operate on traditional regulated market.188 In the light of these differences
and comparative recency of crowdfunding as alternative funding, IOSCO’s
reluctance to propose universal standards and rules becomes
understandable.
G.

What Can Be Improved about the G-20’s Work and the
Achievements of the G-20 in Securities Regulation
One of the areas of securities regulation that has not seen many real

178. GPFI 2016 Progress Report to G20 Leaders, GPFI, https://www.gpfi.org/sites/
default/files/documents/GPFI%202016%20Progress%20Report%20to%20G20%20
Leaders.pdf.
179. OECD, supra note 174.
180. GPFI, supra note178.
181. OICU-IOSCO, supra note 170.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Follak, supra note 168, at 170.
185. See, e.g., Therese Torris, Global Crowdfunding and Local Regulation: From Light
Touch to Prescriptive Bespoke Rules, CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 18, 2016, 11:10 AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/05/85762-global-crowdfunding-local-regulation-from-light-touch-to-prescriptive-bespoke-rules/ [https://perma.cc/5VQF-TTSG].
186. GPFI, supra note 178.
187. See Torris, supra note 185.
188. Id.
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changes is shadow banking, particularly securities financing.189 Shadow
banking involves non-banking entities, but these entities are also prone to
runs and contagions due to the leveraged nature of the financial product
involved.190 After the Seoul Summit of 2010, the G-20 requested the FSB
to produce recommendations on shadow banking.191 Although the FSB
responded to the request by proposing a framework of numerical haircuts
on securities financing in 2013, there was no regulatory action taken.192
Two years later, the BIS also produced their recommendations on haircut
floors for non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions. However,
there is no legislative response up to this date from the members of the G20.193
The members provide various explanations for the absence of legislative action to bring recommendations to life. For example, the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) highlights the fact that there is no harmonized
definition of procyclicality or leverage in the current European Union legislation, and this fact complicates the attempts to implement the FSB’s proposal.194 The ESRB also blames a lack of consensus on the difficulty of
designing a system-wide framework to tackle the build-up of leverage specifically applicable to securities financing transactions.195 On the other
hand, the ESRB admits that the FSB’s recommendations are internationally
agreed proposals.196 Thus, the absence of a harmonized definition of procyclicality or leverage cannot explain the lack of legislation in the European
Union, while three years have passed since the FSB’s proposal.197
Besides the lack of action in securities financing, the crux of the G20’s criticism comes from its ultimate structure.198 Therefore, the recommendations for improvement will target the organization itself instead of
particular initiatives concerning securities regulation. G-20’s positive experience with the ESMID program suggests that the G-20 can meaningfully
affect securities regulation if the measure is targeted at particular countries. However, it does not mean that the regulations aimed at diverse
group of countries such as the G-20 are doomed to be inefficient. The G-20
189. Tarullo, supra note 69, at 13.
190. Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework for
Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos, FSB (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130829b.pdf?page_moved=1. [https://
perma.cc/L599-92GZ].
191. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Haircut Floors for Non-Centrally
Cleared Securities Financing Transactions, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 5,
2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d340.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG8W-5J28].
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. ESRB Opinion on ESMA on Securities Financing Transactions and Leverage under
Article 29 of the SFTR, ESRB (Oct. 2016), https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
20161004_esrbopinion.en.pdf?eb4c21d49897bfc6f7036b502eb631c2 [https://
perma.cc/9DPU-56DC].
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Homi Kharas, The G-20 Has Disappointed on International Financing,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REP., 18 (2012).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-3\CIN307.txt

2017

unknown

A Global Body and a Global Problem

Seq: 19

7-MAR-18

12:34

661

needs to focus on factors that are common for both developed and developing economies.199
For example, the organization should prioritize increasing resources
for infrastructure development because it is useful both for the developed
economies as well as emerging markets.200 The G-20 should also ensure
that the organizations that were asked to provide cooperation (such as the
IMF) actually comply with the set deadlines to promote credibility and
trustworthiness of these organizations.201 The Group should also keep in
mind that when several organizations, such as the IOSCO, FSB and IMF
work on the same issue upon the G-20’s request, their actions can be
poorly coordinated.202
Despite numerous criticisms of the G-20, the organization has several
noteworthy achievements in the area of securities regulation.203 For example, at the G-20’s request, the FSB has been conducting annual monitoring
exercises among its twenty four members in the area of shadow banking.204 Overall, the FSB’s role in developing specific measures to tackle the
consequences of the global financial crisis has strengthened since 2008.205
At the very least, the G-20 meetings resulted in providing frameworks for
securities regulation, which later were used to devise specific measures.206
The organization’s reports follows the work of standard-setting bodies such
as IOSCO to ensure that the framework the G-20 developed is used to produce actual results.207
The cooperation between the G-20 and the IOSCO deserves special
attention as another testimony to the G-20’s achievements in securities regulation.208 Firstly, the IOSCO’s Technical Committee created a task force
to help the G-20 in mitigating the consequences of the global financial crisis.209 This task force collaborated with the BCBS and the IAIS to produce
a report Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation.210 This
report includes recommendations to reduce differences in regulation of different sectors, including securities regulation.211 The report explicitly
acknowledges that, “This report is part of a global effort to reform and
199. See, e.g., id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 79 (2014).
203. Noelle, supra note 59, at 1.
204. Id. at 62.
205. Eric Helleiner, What Role for the New Financial Stability Board? The Politics of
International Standards after the Crisis, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 282, 285 (2010).
206. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A
Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 521 (2012).
207. Id. at 523.
208. Id. at 537.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Review of Differentiated Nature and
Scope of Financial Regulation: Key Issues and Recommendations, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS (Jan. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/joint24.pdf [https://perma.cc/665YP8T2].
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strengthen financial regulation by the G-20 Leaders.”212
Finally, it is worth remembering that although the standards promulgated by the G-20 and its partners (such as the IOSCO and the FSB) are
soft standards in the majority of the times, it does not mean that the leaders of the member countries will ignore the rules.213 A number of factors
(such as the fact that people in charge of implementing securities regulation domestically are not always political appointees) demonstrate that
there is more hope to the organization’s efficiency.214 Another advantage
of the G-20 is that the organization can provide unique supervision of the
regulations through peer review.215 Often, international financial regulation requires cooperation between two sets of bodies: sectoral standardsetting body such as the IOSCO and a broader organization such as the G20.216
Conclusion
Although the G-20’s efforts and initiatives in securities regulation were
not flawless, it should be kept in mind that the global financial crisis
brought unprecedented amount of instability and uncertainty.217 It is not
surprising that the G-20 leaders could not state more specific goals, especially at the first summits, because they did not have a full understanding
of the details involved in securities regulation.218 For example, the G-20
did not realize the significance of cross-border securities immediately.219
However, once the G-20 would realize the extent and complexity of a phenomenon, they would take an immediate action. The example with crossborder securities serves as a proof; the G-20 endorsed the development of
the Handbook on Securities Statistics as early as in 2009.220
Additionally, securities regulation involves a number of subgroups
and issues, such as cross-border securities, credit default swaps, OTC derivatives, and so on.221 As time passed, new related areas emerged, such as
crowdfunding.222 It is hard to produce the same high level of efficiency in
regulation of these numerous areas because of the diversity of the G-20’s
member body. Sometimes wait-and-see approach, although not ideal,
might be the only workable solution when the regulatory regimes of the
member countries cannot be reconciled, as is the case with crowdfunding
212. Id.
213. Cho & Kelly, supra note 206, at 551.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Tarullo, supra note 69, at 9.
217. JOHN J. KIRTON, G20 GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD 32 (2016).
218. Id.
219. Heath, supra note 70, at 15.
220. Handbook on Securities Statistics, IMF (2015), http://www.imf.org/external/np/
sta/wgsd/pdf/hss.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ5U-QRNH].
221. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 93, at 854.
222. See, e.g., Giuliana Borello, Veronica de Crescenzo & Flavio Pichler, The Funding
Gap and the Role of Financial Return Funding: Some Evidence from European Platforms, 20
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at the moment.223
Despite criticisms, the G-20 was instrumental in strengthening the
authority of standard-setting bodies such as IOSCO and the FSB in securities regulation. Both organizations provided projects at the G-20’s direct
requests, as was the case with the Handbook on Securities Statistics and the
FSB’s recommendations on shadow banking.224

223. See, e.g., Torris, supra note 185.
224. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 67, at 526 (2015); see also Handbook on Securities Statistics, supra note 220.
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